Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction
Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay Kellner 1

1 The Institute for Social Research and its Original Program

/1 The State of Contemporary Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research
Max Horkheimer 25

/2 Psychoanalysis and Sociology
Erich Fromm 37

/3 On Sociology of Literature
Leo Lowenthal 40

/4 Notes on Science and the Crisis
Max Horkheimer 52

/5 Philosophy and Critical Theory
Herbert Marcuse 58

II Fragments of a Theory of Society

/6 The Jews and Europe
Max Horkheimer 77

/7 State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations
Frederick Pollock 95
8 From Ontology to Technology: Fundamental Tendencies of Industrial Society
Herbert Marcuse 119
9 The Culture Industry Reconsidered
Theodor W. Adorno 128
10 The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article
Jürgen Habermas 136

III Cultural Criticism and the Critique of Mass Culture
11 The Mass Ornament
Siegfried Kracauer 145
12 Lyric Poetry and Society
Theodor W. Adorno 155
13 Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia
Walter Benjamin 172
14 Historical Perspectives on Popular Culture
Leo Lowenthal 184
15 Perennial Fashion—Jazz
Theodor W. Adorno 199

IV Critical Theory and Psychology
16 Politics and Psychoanalysis
Erich Fromm 213
17 Introduction to The Authoritarian Personality
Theodor W. Adorno et al. 219
18 The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man
Herbert Marcuse 233
19 The Crisis of Psychoanalysis
Erich Fromm 247

V Critical Visions
20 Theses on the Philosophy of History
Walter Benjamin 255
21 Notes on Institute Activities
Max Horkheimer 264
22 Society
Theodor W. Adorno 267
23 Liberation from the Affluent Society
Herbert Marcuse 276
24 The Reification of the Proletariat
Herbert Marcuse 288
25 The Tasks of a Critical Theory of Society
Jürgen Habermas 292
Annotated Bibliography 313
of instinctual psychic reactions, performed in childhood (just as a war cannot be waged without weapons), though these emotional attitudes are of an omnipresent nature so that the where and when of their emergence is the consequence of social changes; these phenomena are not maladjusted, neurotic reactions attached to infantile fixations in the previously defined sense.

The quasineurotic behavior of the masses, which is an appropriate reaction to current and real, though harmful and unsuitable, living conditions, cannot then be "cured" by "analyzing" them. Instead, it demands the transformation and elimination of those very living conditions. To be sure, one can better understand a number of political phenomena with the help of psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, it would be a false conception to believe that psychoanalysis can replace politics.

This abrupt rejection of psychoanalysis as a means of changing social conditions requires modification in one point. It is often the case in social life that the changing of certain institutions fails not because the actual conditions prevent change, but because certain illusions of the people hinder them from doing that which is appropriate for them even long after the real conditions which brought about those illusions have disappeared.

The ideological superstructure often continues to exist longer than the socioeconomic basis would necessitate. Since psychoanalysis is theoretically suited to explain the genesis of certain socially relevant illusions, it can serve a political function in certain social situations, a function that is also probably the essential cause of its rejection by the official institutions of society, and particularly by its scientific officials.

The theoretical and practical relationship of psychoanalysis and politics contains a multitude of problems not or only barely touched upon here. The purpose of these remarks here is simply to try and correct the crudest misunderstandings and also provide a few hints towards a positive treatment of the problem.

Notes
2. Ibid., 38.
4. Karl Kautsky has clearly and plainly drawn attention to this difference in the first volume of his Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung (1927), but without having always followed this conception in his earlier works, or without even utilizing a more correct conception of psychoanalysis in the work just cited.

17
Introduction to
The Authoritarian Personality
Theodor W. Adorno et al.

This is a book about social discrimination. But its purpose is not simply to add a few more empirical findings to an already extensive body of information. The central theme of the work is a relatively new concept— the rise of an "anthropological" species we call the authoritarian type of man. In contrast to the bigot of the older style, he seems to combine the ideas and skills which are typical of a highly industrialized society with irrational or antirational beliefs. He is at the same time enlightened and superstitious, proud to be an individualist and in constant fear of not being like all the others, jealous of his independence and inclined to submit blindly to power and authority. The character structure which comprises these conflicting trends has already attracted the attention of modern psychologists and political thinkers. This book approaches the problem with the means of sociopsychological research.

The implications and values of the study are practical as well as theoretical. The authors do not believe that there is a short cut to education which will eliminate the long and often circuitous road of painstaking research and theoretical analysis. Nor do they think that such a problem as the position of minorities in modern society, and more specifically the problem of religious and racial hatreds, can be tackled successfully either by the propaganda of tolerance or by apologetic refutation of errors and lies. On the other hand, theoretical activity and practical application are not separated by an unbridgeable gulf. Quite the contrary: the authors are imbued with the conviction that the sincere and systematic scientific elucidation of a phenomenon of such great historical meaning can contribute directly to an amelioration of the cultural atmosphere in which hatred breeds.

This conviction must not be brushed aside as an optimistic illusion. In
the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when major delusions were healed not by focused propaganda but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. Their intellectual contribution, operating within the framework of the development of society as a whole, was decisively effective.

I should like to cite two examples. The superstitious belief in witchcraft was overcome in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries after men had come more and more under the influence of the results of modern science. The impact of Cartesian rationalism was decisive. This school of philosophers demonstrated—and the natural scientists following them made practical use of their great insight—that the previously accepted belief in the immediate effect of spiritual factors on the realm of the corporeal is an illusion. Once this scientifically untenable dogma was eliminated, the foundations of the belief it magic were destroyed.

As a more recent example, we have only to think of the impact of Sigmund Freud’s work on modern culture. Its primary importance does not lie in the fact that psychological research and knowledge have been enriched by new findings but in the fact that for some fifty years the intellectual, and especially the educational, world has been made more and more aware of the connection between the suppression of children (both within the home and outside) and society’s usually naive ignorance of the psychological dynamics of the life of the child and the adult alike. The permeation of the social consciousness at large with the scientifically acquired experience that the events of early childhood are of prime importance for the happiness and work-potential of the adult has brought about a revolution in the relation between parents and children which would have been deemed impossible a hundred years ago.

The present work, we hope, will find a place in this history of the interdependence between science and the cultural climate. Its ultimate goal is to open new avenues in a research area which can become of immediate practical significance. It seeks to develop and promote an understanding of social-psychological factors which have made it possible for the authoritarian type of man to threaten to replace the individualistic and democratic type prevalent in the past century and a half of our civilization, and of the factors by which this threat may be contained. Progressive analysis of this new “anthropological” type and of its growth conditions, with an ever-increasing scientific differentiation, will enhance the chances of a genuinely educational counterattack.

Confidence in the possibility of a more systematic study of the mechanisms of discrimination and especially of a characterological differentiation-type is not based on the historical experience of the last fifteen years alone, but also on developments within the social sciences themselves during recent decades. Considerable and successful efforts have been made in this country as well as in Europe to raise the various disciplines dealing with man as a social phenomenon at the organizational level of cooperation that has been a tradition in the natural sciences. What I am thinking of are not merely mechanical arrangements for bringing together work done in various fields of study, as in symposia or textbooks, but the mobilization of different methods and skills, developed in distinct fields of theory and empirical investigation, for one common research program. Such cross-fertilization of different branches of the social sciences and psychology is exactly what has taken place in the present volume. Experts in the fields of social theory and depth psychology, content analysis, clinical psychology, political sociology, and projective testing pooled their experiences and findings. Having worked together in the closest cooperation, they now present as the result of their joint efforts the elements of a theory of the authoritarian type of man in modern society.

They are not unmindful that they were not the first to have studied this phenomenon. They gratefully acknowledge their debt to the remarkable psychological profiles of the prejudiced individual projected by Sigmund Freud, Maurice Samuel, Otto Fenichel, and others. Such brilliant insights were in a sense the indispensable prerequisites for the methodological integration and research organization which the present study has attempted, and we think achieved to a certain degree, on a scale previously unapproached.

The research to be reported in this volume was guided by the following major hypothesis: that the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a “mentality” or “spirit,” and that this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality.

The major concern was with the potentially fascist individual, one whose structure is such as to render him particularly susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda. We say “potential” because we have not studied individuals who were avowedly fascist or who belonged to known fascist circles. At the time when most of our data were collected, fascism had just been defeated in war and, hence, we could not expect to find subjects who would openly identify themselves with it; yet there was no difficulty in finding subjects whose outlook was such as to indicate that they would readily accept fascism if it should become a strong or respectable social movement.

In concentrating upon the potential fascist we do not wish to imply that other patterns of personality and ideology might not profitably be studied in the same way. It is our opinion, however, that no politico-social trend
imposes a graver threat to our traditional values and institutions than
does fascism, and that knowledge of the personality forces that favor its
acceptance may ultimately prove useful in combating it. A question may
be raised as to why, if we wish to explore new resources for combating
fascism, we do not give as much attention to the "potential antifascist."
The answer is that we do study trends that stand in opposition to fascism,
but we do not conceive that they constitute any single pattern. It is one of
the major findings of the present study that individuals who show extreme
susceptibility to fascist propaganda have a great deal in common. (They
exhibit numerous characteristics that go together to form a "syndrome," although typical variations within this major pattern can be distinguished.)
Individuals who are extreme in the opposite direction are much more
diverse. The task of diagnosing potential fascism and studying its determi-
nants required techniques especially designed for these purposes; it could
not be asked of them that they serve as well for various other patterns.
Nevertheless, it was possible to distinguish several types of personality
structure that seemed particularly resistant to antidemocratic ideas, and
these are given due attention in later chapters.

If a potentially fascistic individual exists, what, precisely, is he like?
What goes to make up antidemocratic thought? What are the organizing
forces within the person? And if such a person exists, what have been the
determinants and what the course of his development?

These are questions upon which the present research was designed to
throw some light. Though the notion that the potentially antidemocratic
individual is a totality may be accepted as a plausible hypothesis, some
analysis is called for at the start. In most approaches to the study of
political types two essential conceptions may be distinguished: the
conception of ideology and the conception of underlying needs in the
person. Though the two may be thought of as forming an organized whole
within the individual, they may nonetheless be studied separately.
The same ideological trends may in different individuals have different
sources, and the same personal needs may express themselves in different
ideological trends.

The term ideology is used in this book, in the way that is common in
current literature, to stand for an organization of opinions, attitudes, and
values—a way of thinking about man and society. We may speak of an
individual's total ideology or of his ideology with respect to different areas
of social life: politics, economics, religion, minority groups, and so forth.
Ideologies have an existence independent of any single individual; and
those which exist at a particular time are results both of historical processes
and of contemporary social events. These ideologies have different degrees
of appeal for different individuals, a matter that depends upon the individu-
al's needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or
frustrated.

There are, to be sure, individuals who take unto themselves ideas from
more than one existing ideological system and weave them into patterns
that are more or less uniquely their own. It can be assumed, however, that
when the opinions, attitudes, and values of numerous individuals are
examined, common patterns will be discovered. These patterns may not
in all cases correspond to the familiar, current ideologies, but they will
fulfill the definition of ideology given above and in each case be found to
have a function within the overall adjustment of the individual.

The present inquiry into the nature of the potentially fascistic individual
began with anti-Semitism in the focus of attention. The authors, in com-
mon with most social scientists, hold the view that anti-Semitism is based
more largely upon factors in the subject and in his total situation than upon
actual characteristics of Jews, and that one place to look for determinants
of anti-Semitic opinions and attitudes is within the persons who express
them. Since this emphasis on personality required a focusing of attention
on psychology rather than on sociology or history—though in the last
analysis the three can be separated only artificially—there could be no
attempt to account for the existence of anti-Semitic ideas in our society.

The question was, rather, Why is it that certain individuals accept these
ideas while others do not? And since from the start the research was guided
by the hypotheses stated above, it was supposed (1) that anti-Semitism
probably is not a specific or isolated phenomenon but a part of a broader
ideological framework, and (2) that an individual's susceptibility to this
ideology depends primarily upon his psychological needs.

The hypotheses concerning the antidemocratic individual which are present in our general cultural climate, must be supported
by a great deal of painstaking observation, and in many instances by
quantification, before they can be regarded as conclusive. How can one
say with assurance that the numerous opinions, attitudes, and values
expressed by an individual actually constitute a consistent pattern or
organized totality? The most intensive investigation of that individual
would seem to be necessary. How can one say that opinions, attitudes,
and values found in groups of people go together to form patterns, some
of which are more common than others? There is no adequate way to
proceed other than by actually measuring, in populations, a wide variety
of thought contents and determining by means of standard statistical
methods which ones go together.

To many social psychologists the scientific study of ideology, as it has
been defined, seems a hopeless task. To measure with suitable accuracy
a single, specific, isolated attitude is a long and arduous proceeding for
only through intensive investigation, through the detailed survey of what is on the surface and the thorough probing of what lies beneath it.

A question may be raised as to what is the degree of relationship between ideology and action. If an individual is making antidemocratic propaganda or engaging in overt attacks upon minority groups, it is usually assumed that his opinions, attitudes, and values are congruent with his action; but comfort is sometimes found in the thought that though another individual expresses antidemocratic ideas verbally, he does not, and perhaps will not, put them into overt action. Here, once again, there is a question of potentialities. Overt action, like open verbal expression, depends very largely upon the situation of the moment—something that is best described in socioeconomic and political terms—but individuals differ widely with respect to their readiness to be provoked into action.

The study of this potential is a part of the study of the individual's overall ideology; to know what kinds and what intensities of belief, attitude, and value are likely to lead to action, and to know what forces within the individual serve as inhibitions upon action are matters of the greatest practical importance.

There seems little reason to doubt that ideology-in-readiness (ideological receptivity) and ideology-in-words and action are essentially the same staff. The description of an individual's total ideology must portray not only the organization on each level but organization among levels. What the individual consistently says in public, what he says when he feels safe from criticism, what he thinks but will not say at all, what he thinks but will not admit to himself, what he is disposed to think or to do when various kinds of appeals are made to him—all these phenomena may be conceived of as constituting a single structure. The structure may not be integrated, it may contain contradictions as well as consistencies, but it is organized in the sense that the constituent parts are related in psychologically meaningful ways.

In order to understand such a structure, a theory of the total personality is necessary. According to the theory that has guided the present research, personality is a more or less enduring organization of forces within the individual. These persisting forces of personality help to determine response in various situations, and it is thus largely to them that consistency of behavior—whether verbal or physical—is attributable. But behavior, however consistent, is not the same thing as personality; personality lies behind behavior and within the individual. The forces of personality are not responses but readinesses for response; whether or not a readiness will issue in overt expression depends not only upon the situation of the moment but upon what other readinesses stand in opposition to it. Personality forces which are inhibited are on a deeper level than those which immediately and consistently express themselves in overt behavior.
What are the forces of personality and what are the processes by which they are organized? For theory as to the structure of personality we have leaned most heavily upon Freud, while for a more or less systematic formulation of the more directly observable and measurable aspects of personality we have been guided primarily by academic psychology. The forces of personality are primarily needs (drives, wishes, emotional impulses) which vary from one individual to another in their quality, their intensity, their mode of gratification, and the objects of their attachment, and which interact with other needs in harmonious or conflicting patterns. There are primitive emotional needs; there are needs to avoid punishment and to keep the goodwill of the social group; there are needs to maintain harmony and integration within the self.

Since it will be granted that opinions, attitudes, and values depend upon human needs, and since personality is essentially an organization of needs, then personality may be regarded as a determinant of ideological preferences. Personality is not, however, to be hypostatized as an ultimate determinative. Far from being something which is given in the beginning, which remains fixed and acts upon the surrounding world, personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated from the totality within which it occurs. According to the present theory, the effects of environmental forces in moulding the personality are, in general, the more profound the earlier in the life history of the individual they are brought to bear. The major influences upon personality development arise in the course of child training as carried forward in a setting of family life. What happens here is profoundly influenced by economic and social factors. It is not only that each family in training its children proceeds according to the ways of the social, ethnic, and religious groups in which it has membership; but economic and social factors affect directly the parents' behavior toward the child. This means that broad changes in social conditions and institutions will have a direct bearing upon the kinds of personalities that develop within a society.

The present research seeks to discover correlations between ideology and sociological factors operating in the individual's past—whether or not they continue to operate in his present. In attempting to explain correlations the relationships between personality and ideology are brought into the picture, the general approach being to consider personality as an agency through which sociological factors are the most crucial ones and in what ways they achieve their effects.

Although personality is a product of the social environment of the past, it is not, once it has developed, a mere object of the contemporary environment. What has developed is a structure within the individual something which is capable of self-initiated action upon the social environ-ment and of selection with respect to varied impinging stimuli, something which though always modifiable is frequently very resistant to fundamental change. This conception is necessary to explain consistency of behavior in widely varying situations, to explain the persistence of ideological trends in the face of conflicting facts and radically altered social conditions, to explain why people in the same sociological situation have different or even conflicting views on social issues, and why it is that people whose behavior has been changed through psychological manipulation lapse into their old ways as soon as the agencies of manipulation are removed.

The conception of personality structure is the best safeguard against the inclination to attribute persistent trends in the individual to something "instinctive" or "racial" within him. The Nazi allegation that natural biological traits decide the total being of a person would not have been such a successful political device had it not been possible to point to numerous instances of relative fixity in human behavior and to challenge those who thought to explain them on any basis other than a biological one. Without the conception of personality structure, writers whose approach rests upon the assumption of infinite human flexibility and responsiveness to the social situation of the moment have not helped matters by referring persistent trends which they could not approve to "confusion" or "psychosis" or evil under one name or another. There is, of course, some basis for describing as "pathological" patterns of behavior which do not conform with the most common, and seemingly most lawful, responses to momentary stimuli. But this is to use the term pathological in the very narrow sense of deviation from the average found in a particular context and, what is worse, to suggest that everything in the personality structure is to be regarded as pathological. Actually, personality embraces variables which exist widely in the population and have lawful relations one to another. Personality patterns that have been dismissed as "pathological" because they were not in keeping with the most common manifest trends or the most dominant ideals within a society, have on closer investigation turned out to be but exaggerations of what was almost universal below the surface in that society. What is "pathological" today may with changing social conditions become the dominant trend of tomorrow.

It seems clear then that an adequate approach to the problems before us must take into account both fixity and flexibility; it must regard the two not as mutually exclusive categories but as the extremes of a single continuum along which human characteristics may be placed, and it must provide a basis for understanding the conditions which favor the one extreme or the other. Personality is a concept to account for relative permanence. But it may be emphasized again that personality is mainly a potential; it is a readiness for behavior rather than behavior itself;
although it consists in dispositions to behave in certain ways, the behavior that actually occurs will always depend upon the objective situation. Where the concern is with antidemocratic trends, a delineation of the conditions for individual expression requires an understanding of the total organization of society.

It has been stated that the personality structure may be such as to render the individual susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda. It may now be asked, what are the conditions under which such propaganda would increase in pitch and volume and come to dominate in press and radio, by the exclusion of contrary ideological stimuli, so that what is now potential would become actively manifest. The answer must be sought not in any single personality, not in personality factors found in the mass of people, but in processes at work in society itself. It seems well understood today that whether or not antidemocratic propaganda is to become a dominant force in this country depends primarily upon the situation of the most powerful economic interests, upon whether they, by conscious design or not, make use of this device for maintaining their dominant status. This is a matter about which the great majority of people would have little to say.

The present research, limited as it is to the hitherto largely neglected psychological aspects of fascism, does not concern itself with the production of propaganda. It focuses attention, rather, upon the consumer, the individual for whom the propaganda is designed. In so doing it attempts to take into account not only the psychological structure of the individual but the total objective situation in which he lives. It makes the assumption that people in general tend to accept political and social programs which they believe will serve their economic interests. What these interests are determined, in each case upon the individual's position in society as defined in economic and sociological terms. An important part of the present research, therefore, was the attempt to discover what patterns of socioeconomic factors are associated with receptivity, and with resistance, to antidemocratic propaganda.

At the same time, however, it was considered that economic motives in the individual may not have the dominant and crucial role that is often ascribed to them. If economic self-interest were the only determinant of opinion, we should expect people of the same socioeconomic status to have very similar opinions, and we should expect opinion to vary in a meaningful way from one socioeconomic grouping to another. Research has not given very sound support for these expectations. There is only the most general similarity of opinion among people of the same socioeconomic status, and the exceptions are glaring; while variations from one socioeconomic group to another are rarely simple or clear-cut. To explain why it is that people of the same socioeconomic status so frequently have different ideologies, while people of a different status often have very similar ideologies, we must take account of other than purely economic needs.

More than this, it is becoming increasingly plain that people very frequently do not behave in such a way as to further their material interests, even when it is clear to them what these interests are. The resistance of white-collar workers to organization is not due to a belief that the union will not help them economically; the tendency of the small businessman to side with big business in most economic and political matters cannot be due entirely to a belief that this is the way to guarantee his economic independence. In instances such as these the individual seems not only not to consider his material interests, but even to go against them. It is as if he were thinking in terms of a larger group identification, as if his point of view did not depend merely by his need to support this group and to supersede opposite ones by rational consideration of his own interests.

Indeed, it is with a sense of relief today that one is assured that a group conflict is merely a clash of economic interests—that each side is merely out to “do” the other—and not a struggle in which deep-lying emotional drives have been let loose. When it comes to the ways in which people appraise the social world, irrational trends stand out glaringly. One may conceive of a professional man who opposes the immigration of Jewish refugees on the ground that this will increase the competition with which he has to deal and so decrease his income. However undemocratic this may be, it is at least rational in a limited sense. But for this man to go on, as do most people who oppose Jews on occupational grounds, and accept a wide variety of opinions, many of which are contradictory, about Jews in general, and to attribute various ills of the world to them, is plainly illogical. And it is just as illogical to praise all Jews in accordance with a “good” stereotype of them. Hostility against groups that is based upon real frustration, brought about by members of that group, undoubtedly exists, but such frustrating experiences can hardly account for the fact that prejudice is apt to be generalized. Evidence from the present study confirms what has often been indicated: that a man who is hostile toward one minority group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of others. There is no conceivable rational basis for such generalization; and, what is more striking, prejudice against, or totally uncritical acceptance of, a particular group often exists in the absence of any experience with members of that group. The objective situation of the individual seems an unlikely source of such irrationality; rather, we should seek where psychology has already found the sources of dreams, fantasies, and misinterpretations of the world—that is, in the deep-lying needs of the personality.

Another aspect of the individual's situation which we should expect to affect his ideological receptivity is his membership in social groups—
occupational, fraternal, religious, and the like. For historical and sociological reasons, such groups favor and promulgate, whether officially or unofficially, different patterns of ideas. There is reason to believe that individuals, out of their needs to conform and to belong and to believe and through such devices as initiation and conditioning, often take over more or less ready-made the opinions, attitudes, and values that are characteristic of the groups in which they have membership. To the extent that the ideas which prevail in such a group are implicitly or explicitly antidemocratic, the individual group member might be expected to be receptive to propaganda having the same general direction. Accordingly, the present research investigates a variety of groups memberships with a view to what general trends of thought—and how much variability—might be found in each.

It is recognized, however, that a correlation between group membership and ideology may be due to different kinds of determination in different individuals. In some cases it might be that the individual merely repeats opinions which are taken for granted in his social milieu and which he has no reason to question; in other cases it might be that the individual has chosen to join a particular group because it stood for ideals with which he was already in sympathy. In modern society, despite enormous communality in basic culture, it is rare for a person to be subjected to only one pattern of ideas, after he is old enough for ideas to mean something to him. Some selection is usually made, according, it may be supposed, to the needs of his personality. Even when individuals are exposed during their formative years almost exclusively to a single, closely knit pattern of political, economic, social, and religious ideas, it is found that some conform while others rebel, and it seems proper to inquire whether personality factors do not make the difference. The soundest approach, it would seem, is to consider that in the determination of ideology, as in the determination of any behavior, there is a situational factor and a personality factor, and that a careful weighing of the role of each will yield the most accurate prediction.

Situational factors, chiefly economic condition and social group memberships, have been studied intensively in recent researches on opinion and attitude, while the more inward, more individualistic factors have not received the attention they deserve. Beyond this, there is still another reason why the present study places particular emphasis upon the personality. Fascism, in order to be successful as a political movement, must have a mass basis. It must secure not only the frightened submission but the active cooperation of the great majority of the people. Since by its very nature it favors the few at the expense of the many, it cannot possibly demonstrate that it will so improve the situation of most people that their real interests will be served. It must therefore make its major appeal, not to rational self-interest, but to emotional needs—often to the most primitive and irrational wishes and fears. If it be argued that fascist propaganda fools people into believing that their lot will be improved, then the question arises: Why are they so easily fooled? Because, it may be supposed, of their personality structure; because of long-established patterns of hopes and aspirations, fears and anxieties that dispose them to certain beliefs and make them resistant to others. The task of fascist propaganda, in other words, is rendered easier to the degree that antidemocratic potentials already exist in the great mass of people. It may be granted that in Germany economic conflicts and dislocations within the society were such that for this reason alone the triumph of fascism was sooner or later inevitable; but the Nazi leaders did not act as if they believed this to be so; instead they acted as if it were necessary at every moment to take into account the personality of the people—to activate every ounce of their antidemocratic potential, to compromise with them, to stamp out the slightest spark of rebellion. It seems apparent that any attempt to appraise the chances of a fascist triumph in America must reckon with the potential existing in the character of the people. Here lies not only the susceptibility to antidemocratic propaganda but the most dependable sources of resistance to it.

The present writers believe that it is up to the people to decide whether or not this country goes fascist. It is assumed that knowledge of the nature and extent of antidemocratic potentials will indicate programs for democratic action. These programs should not be limited to devices for manipulating people in such a way that they will behave more democratically, but they should be devoted to increasing the kind of self-awareness and self-determination that makes any kind of manipulation impossible. There is one explanation for the existence of an individual’s ideology that has not so far been considered: that it is the view of the world which a reasonable man, with some understanding of the role of such determinants as those discussed above, and with complete access to the necessary facts, will organize for himself. This conception, though it has been left to the last, is of crucial importance for a sound approach to ideology. Without it we should have to share the destructive view, which has gained some acceptance in the modern world, that since all ideologies, all philosophies, derive from nonrational sources there is no basis for saying that one has more merit than another.

But the rational system of an objective and thoughtful man is not a thing apart from personality. Such a system is still motivated. What is distinguishing in its sources is mainly the kind of personality organization from which it springs. It might be said that a mature personality (if we may for the moment use this term without defining it) will come closer to achieving a rational system of thought than will an immature one; but a personality is no less dynamic and no less organized for being mature,
and the task of describing the structure of this personality is not different in kind from the task of describing any other personality. According to theory, the personality variables which have most to do with determining the objectivity and rationality of an ideology are those which belong to the ego, that part of the personality which appreciates reality, integrates the other parts, and operates with the most conscious awareness.

It is the ego that becomes aware of and takes responsibility for nonrational forces operating within the personality. This is the basis for our belief that the object of knowing what are the psychological determinants of ideology is that men can become more reasonable. It is not supposed, of course, that this will eliminate differences of opinion. The world is sufficiently complex and difficult to know, men have enough real interests that are in conflict with the real interests of other men, there are enough ego-accepted differences in personality to insure that arguments about politics, economics, and religion will never grow dull. Knowledge of the psychological determinants of ideology cannot tell us what is the truest ideology; it can only remove some of the barriers in the way of its pursuit.

18

The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man

Herbert Marcuse

Some of the basic assumptions of Freudian theory in both their orthodox as well as revisionist development have become obsolescent to the degree to which their object, namely, the "individual" as the embodiment of id, ego, and superego has become obsolescent in the social reality. The evolution of contemporary society has replaced the Freudian model by a social atom whose mental structure no longer exhibits the qualities attributed by Freud to the psychoanalytic object. Psychoanalysis, in its various schools, has continued and spread over large sectors of society, but with the change in its object, the gap between theory and therapy has been widened. Therapy is faced with a situation in which it seems to help the Establishment rather than the individual. The truth of psychoanalysis is thereby not invalidated; on the contrary, the obsolescence of its object reveals the extent to which progress has been in reality regression. Psychoanalysis thus sheds new light on the politics of advanced industrial society.

This essay outlines the contribution of psychoanalysis to political thought by trying to show the social and political content in the basic psychoanalytic concepts themselves. The psychoanalytic categories do not have to be "related" to social and political conditions—they are themselves social and political categories. Psychoanalysis could become an effective social and political instrument, positive as well as negative, in an administrative as well as critical function, because Freud had discovered the mechanisms of social and political control in the depth dimension of instinctual drives and satisfactions.

It has often been said that Freud's theory depended, for much of its validity, on the existence of Viennese middle-class society in the decades preceding the fascist era—from the turn of the century to the interwar period. There is a kernel of truth in this facile correlation, but its geographi-